Using an institutionalist approach as the main framework, this research examines the evolution of Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives over the last six decades through four distinct phases -the voluntary collectivization period of 1954-1975, the compulsory collectivization period of 1975-1981, the de-collectivization period of 1981-1997 and the neo-collectivization period since 1997. Based on two case studies, this research examines the role of the Vietnamese government in the development of Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives. It argues that a stable legal environment and appropriate government support are extremely important for the successful development of cooperatives. In terms of theoretical contribution, the study calls for an integration of the notion of institutional dynamics into the current 'static' institutionalism and emphasizes the need to analyse institutions' influences at central, local and organizational levels to understand the formation and development of organizations. It also offers some policy implications that are relevant to the development of cooperatives in other economies. 
Introduction
Agriculture has long been an important sector in the Vietnamese economy.In 2011, earnings from the agriculture sector, which includes farming, forestry and fishery, accounted for 22.02 per cent of Vietnam's gross domestic product (GDP) (GSO 2012) . The agriculture sector's share of economic output has declined in recent years, falling as a share of GDP from 40.49 per cent in 1991 to 25.77 per cent in 1997 and to around 20 per cent since 2005, as growth in other sectors of the economy has gained pace. However, Vietnam can be still called an agricultural country, as this sector remains the major source of employment (Wolz and Pham 2010) . About 50 per cent of the Vietnamese labour force works in the agricultural sector (Nguyen 2012) . In 2012, 68 per cent of the total population live in rural areas (GSO 2013, 63) .
Agricultural cooperatives were an essential tool in combatting poverty in the 1950s and today play a crucial role in promoting effective allocation of resources and efficiency in production in Vietnam. However, ever since the birth of the co-operative movement in the agriculture sector, the development and evolution of this form of economic organisation has not been an easy process. The present day concept of agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam is the outcome of a long drawn out process of development. In retrospect, the development of Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives can be classified into four distinct phases: (1) the voluntary collectivisation period of ; (2) the compulsory collectivisation period of [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] ; (3) the de-collectivisation period of 1981 -1997; and (4) the neo-collectivisation period since 1997.
Despite the fact that agricultural collectivisation is a significant issue in contemporary Vietnamese political and economic history, there has been a limited amount of research on Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives. Existing research in this area has focused predominantly on the impact of agriculture sector on the Vietnamese economy (Truong 1987; Pingali and Vo 1992; Asian Development Bank 2002; Nguyen 2003) , land reform and distribution (Moise 1983; Ravallion and Van de Walle 2003; Kerkvliet, 2006) , agricultural techniques and innovation (Kaiser 1997; Foerster and Nguyen 1999; Nguyen 2000; Nguyen 2007 ), agricultural productivity (Bui 2003; Ho 2012) , economic reforms and their impact on agriculture (Tran, 1998a) , and government policies on agricultural development (Cohen 2001) . Nevertheles, agricultural cooperatives have been understudied. In particular, there is a dearth of empirical studies on the evolution of agricultural cooperatives after Vietnam's new Cooperative Law of 1997 was launched and the role of the government and its agencies in this process. While there are a few notable studies, such as Truong (1987) , Kerkvliet (1994 Kerkvliet ( , 1998 Kerkvliet ( , 2005 Kerkvliet ( , 2006 , Tran (1998a Tran ( , 1998b , Wolz and Pham (2010) , which provided excellent analyses of agricultural cooperatives in different periods and of the impact of economic reforms on agricultural cooperatives, surprisingly there has not been a review of the performance of Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives that covers their development from their establishment in the 1950s until today.
The purpose of this study is, therefore, two-fold. Firstly, it aims to fill the gap in the literature by presenting a comprehensive review on Vietnam's agricultural cooperatives in the past six decades, with an emphasis on the period after the issue of the new 1997
Cooperatives Law. Secondly, it examines the development of contemporary agricultural cooperatives and the role that government agencies have played in this process. It explores some interrelated research questions, namely 1) How have Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives developed in the last six decades? 2) How do government agencies support the operations of agricultural cooperatives? and 3) How will the agricultural cooperatives evolve in the future?
Literature Review
This section highlights the relevance of the institutional framework for the analysis of economic structures and their behaviours. The institutionalist approach provides a valuable method for understanding the evolution and perpetuation of firms' behaviours. It then discusses the formation and evolution of Vietnamese agricultural cooperative models over the last six decades.
The institutionalist approach and its application in understanding the evolution of firms
Recent decades have witnessed the strong development of institutionalism. Comparative institutionalism analysis shows how different forms of economic organisation have been established, reproduced and changed in different market economies. It focuses on macrolevel societal institutions, in particular those that govern 'access to critical resources, especially labour and capital' (Whitley, 1999: 47) .
A systematic analysis of main national institutions and the interactions between these institutional arrangements and the activities of business organisations has been conceptualised in terms of 'societal logic' (Maurice et al., 1996) , 'social systems of production' (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997) , 'industrial orders' (Herrigel, 1996) , 'national industrial order ' (Lane, 1992) or ' national business systems' (Whitley, 1999 ). Lane's framework (1992) for example consists of the state, the financial system, the system of education and training, and to a lesser extent, the network of business associations and the system of industrial relations. Institutionalism explains how national institutions impose structural limitations on social actors and mediate or modify international pressures.
The effects of variations in businesses' institutional contexts on firms' behaviour are prominent, as a 'firm will gravitate towards the mode of coordination for which there is institutional support ' (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 9) . It is now widely accepted that the influence of such social institutions is so strong that they can almost be regarded as additional factors of production which become the basis of competitive advantage or disadvantage (Maurice at al., 1980; Lane, 1992; Porter, 1990) . The role of the government for instance in economic planning and controlling in different countries affects a firm's organisational structure, its willingness to undertake long-term investments, and its dependence on state agencies in making decisions. In this case, what is 'rational' strategic behaviour is determined according to the role of the state.
The main contribution of the institutionalist approach is the establishment of a conceptual framework allowing study of firms' behaviours. However, the institutional perspective is criticised, firstly, as being insensitive to the 'soft' part in business organisations. Firm behaviour is over-determined by national stereotypes and the potential for human agency neglected within this framework (Gamble, 2001) . Secondly, it might be problematic when applying an institutionalist approach to understand a business system in its transitional period, where 'previously latent institutions may suddenly become salient, old institutions may be put in the service of different ends or actors goals or strategies may shift within existing institutions ' (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 16) .
The Formation and Evolution of Vietnamese Agricultural Cooperative Models
The International Cooperative Alliance defined a cooperative as 'an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise' (ICA 2013) . Neoclassical economists suggested that economic agents will coordinate their actions and engage in industry development activities whenever the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs. Chloupková (2002) argued that one of the characteristics of the cooperatives under the communist regime was forced membership, and as a result these cooperatives did not obey the principles set by ICA, even though they were touted by the government as collective farms aimed at 'joining resources and sharing benefits'. Parnell (1992) aptly pointed out that in communist countries, cooperatives were considered as a stepping stone to less centralised economies and in capitalist countries as a counterbalance to the strongly capitalist market-based system.
Agricultural Cooperatives in the Voluntary Collectivisation Period of 1954-1975
During the French colonial period, there was a high concentration of land in the hands of a small elite group of French and Vietnamese. According to Wolf (1999, 166) (Pingali and Vo 1992) .
In the North, large landowners and rich peasants were publicly denounced as landlords, and their land redistributed to poor and middle class peasants, particularly to those with ties to the Communist Party. By 1956, this programme of redistribution had transferred ownership of substantially all the available land to farmers in a largely equitable manner which benefitted approximately 73 per cent of the North's rural population (Truong 1987, 35) . The North also entered a stage of agricultural collectivization.
The initial steps were to establish work-exchange teams (to doi cong), a simple form of agricultural collectivisation, which included the majority of the farmers. This collective economic form was organized on the principle of voluntary participation. Farmers retained ownership of land and equipment and were in control of production on their land but were encouraged to assist each other during periods of peak labour demand by joining seasonal or permanent working teams. The work-exchange teams helped to improve agricultural production during the post-war period. As a result, food output increased 57 per cent with average food per capita of 303 kg per year. This not only ensured food for domestic consumption but also yielded a surplus for export in1956 and 1957 (Tran 1998a, 32) .
Encouraged by the positive results of this 'golden period' (Tran 1998a, 32) , the Government decided to accelerate the agriculture collectivisation program throughout North Vietnam. Work-exchange teams were transformed into agricultural cooperatives, starting out at a low level (1958) (1959) (1960) and advancing to the high level of cooperatives (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) . The low level of cooperatives worked on the principle that farmers also kept their own land, traction animals and equipment but farmed according to the general plan of the cooperative, while in the high level of cooperatives, all land and farm instruments were put under cooperative properties and farmers worked under a unified management (Pingali and Vo 1992) . (Tran 1998a, 32) . However, this early success was short-lived. Between 1962 Between -1975 , the average growth in the yield of rice, the most important crop of the country, was only 1.1 per cent per year with negative growth in seven out of fourteen years (FAO 2000 as quoted in Nguyen 2000, 25) . The reasons that the system did not function as expected are many. Agricultural cooperatives constrained individual choice and eliminated the economic incentives required for efficient agricultural production and markets. The mandatory collectivisation policies resulted in the removal of private farm ownership, and reduced the economic incentives for farmers to produce and market their crops. These factors ultimately dampened farmers' enthusiasm for work and resulted in both low agricultural efficiency and productivity (Tran 1998b) .
Agricultural Cooperatives in the Compulsory Collectivisation Period of 1975-1981
After the country was reunited in1975, the Communist Party quickly sought to establish a socialist production in the hitherto capitalist-oriented South and thus bring this part of the country in line with the North. The Communist Party outlawed tenancy and enforced agricultural cooperatives in the South. In these cooperatives, the cultivation of crops, the division of labour, and the distribution of the harvest was bureaucratically managed and the state retained the ownership of land. Farmers were subjected to a food obligation policy that was implemented in 1978 and 1979, which required them to sell a quota of grain to the state at fixed prices in exchange for fertiliser, gasoline, bricks, and consumer goods at subsidized prices. Free market prices for grain were eight times higher than state prices while state-supplied goods were usually inferior in quality, insufficient in quantity, and delivered late, which interrupted planting and thereby hurt production (Raymond 2008) .
The policy faced with stiff resistance from farmers from the very early stage. The level of success of collectivisation and the forced cooperatives program varied significantly in different regions. According to Tran (1998a, 33) , in central of Vietnam in 1978, over 67,000 peasant households participated in cooperatives. By the end of 1980 there were 673,500 households in cooperatives, accounting for 83.8 percent of the number of agricultural households. In the eastern region of South Vietnam, only 1.6 percent of the total peasant households had joined cooperatives by the end of 1978. In the western region, the Mekong delta, the situation was even worse with only 0.2 percent of all peasant households joining cooperatives. Despite all efforts, the government's attempt to use a collective mode of production to increase productivity and achieve a large surplus was (Nguyen 2000, 25) .
Agricultural Cooperatives in the De-Collectivisation Period of 1981 -1997
This period was marked by signicant reform in the Vietnamese economy in general and agricultural cooperatives in particular. After the unification, under the socialist economic system, the state and collective sectors, which were highly subsidised by the state budget, were the foundation of the economy. Large-scale private economic organisations were forced or encouraged to join the state or collective sectors. This process effectively eliminated the market mechanism except in small-scale (household) activities. Therefore, it became clear as early as 1977 that the economic strategy was not working, with the economy witnessing steady declines in production and productivity in vital industries, including agriculture (Le and McCarty, 1995: 100) . In 1980, Vietnam's GDP growth rate was -1.6 per cent (Statistical Yearbook 1995) . In the same year, food production reached only 69 per cent of its target (Vu 1995, 19) . By the mid-1980s, Vietnamese economy was barely sustained thanks to significant assistance from the Eastern bloc (now a burdensome debt for Vietnam). The lowest point was reached in 1985, when a miscalculated currency reform plan was introduced, effectively re-valuing the Dong, in a bid to reduce the amount of money circulating and encourage the import-reliant economy but in fact resulted in an escalating inflation rate. As Wurfel (1993: 23) 2008, 52) . However, the growth occurred mainly in the first year after 'Contract 100' was implemented. After 1982, the country again experienced a continual decrease in the rice yield growth rate from year to year, which became negative in 1987. Pingali and Vo (1992) argued that the main reasons for this failure was the cumbersome, top down planning approach in production, the frequent failure of the state to buy all the contracted products from farmers due to limited funds, and the lack of security in land tenure resulting in insufficient investments at the farm level. Fundamentally the cooperative model was still based on collective ownership, centrally run management and the uniform distribution of products based on workdays. Collective farmers were paid 'work points', which were converted into amounts of agricultural products such as rice and other food and occasionally money through an elaborate assessment method that assured everyone a basic share of each collective's net income but provided little reward for productivity and innovation (Kerkvliet 2006) .
In response to the problem of critically low agricultural production in the second half of 
Agricultural Cooperatives in the Neo-Collectivisation Period Since 1997
Although cooperatives continued to exist, their major traditional tasks in agricultural production were no longer needed (Wolz and Pham 2010) . Many of them failed to provide the necessary services to the newly-established family farmers, especially input supply (Sultan and Wolz 2012) . In this context, the Cooperative Law was introduced in 1997.
According to Sultan and Wolz (2012) , the Cooperative Law was developed based on the basic principles of the international cooperative movement and reflected user-centred policies and voluntary membership. Compared with the old model, the new model focuses more on providing services and marketing activities to its members (Table 1) .
Insert Table 1 here There were three options for previously existing agricultural cooperatives under the new law (Wolz and Pham 2010 ). They included: (i) the conversion of the old style agricultural cooperatives into viable agricultural service cooperatives that had to be newly-registered; (ii) the dissolution of old style agricultural cooperatives; and (iii) the formation and registration of new agricultural service cooperatives. There was an initial lack of interest from cooperatives in the conversion process and it took much longer than anticipated to finalise (Sultan and Wolz 2012) . 
Performance of the New Agricultural Cooperatives
As of 31 st December 2010, there were 6,302 agricultural cooperatives (GSO 2012, 58) . This 
Research Methodology
A case study approach is used in this study because of its suitability for exploratory and descriptive research, and studies where the phenomenon under investigation is very much socially and contextually situated (Yin 1994; Marshall and Rossman 1995) . Case studies enable researchers to observe phenomena as they occur in their settings, a feature that allows surrounding social and structural intricacies to be exposed and unravelled (Yin 1994) . This essentially provides a more accurate conception of events and behaviours, and a more comprehensive understanding of the associations that influence the phenomenon in question (Eisenhardt 1989; Orum et al. 1991) .
Two agricultural cooperatives were chosen to study, coded in this research as AG1 and AG2 (Table 2) . Some criteria govern the choice of cooperatives: (1) the size of the cooperativespriority is given to cooperatives that have a larger number of members; (2) age of the cooperatives. AG1 represents old cooperatives that have a long history dating back to pre-Doi
Moi period. It has survived many waves of changes in government policies and thrived in the new context. Meanwhile AG2 represents the newcomers that have only been established in the last decade; and (3) accessibility to the cooperatives.
Insert Table 2 here
Interviews were the primary source of research data, and the focal point of the empirical research element of this work. There were two groups of interviewees: those inside the cooperatives and outside the cooperatives. The first group included the Chairman and/or Vice Chairman and members of the cooperatives (at least two at each cooperative). It was considered necessary to conduct interviews at two levels to cross check the information as well as to examine whether the policies stated and described by the board of management were indeed implemented at lower levels of the organisations. There was also a need to corroborate the information provided, and thereby reduce hidden bias and aid reliability.
The second group included government officials from the Cooperative Department at the
Ministry of Planning and Investment and the provincial Departments of Agriculture and
Rural Development (DARD). These departments have played a very active role in implementing Decision 80, by supporting the establishment of cooperatives and facilitating the signing of contract farming between cooperatives and agricultural product purchasing companies. Interviewing personnel outside the enterprise context was considered vital, given that one of the aims of the research is to understand the role of the government and its agencies in the development of agricultural cooperatives.
Interview questions were organised into six themes: history of the cooperatives, profiles of the households, their agricultural production, the households' current use of cooperative services, the respondents' assessments on the services provided by cooperatives and any factors that hinder or facilitate the operations of cooperatives. Semi-structured interviews were conducted on site in 2004 and over the phone in 2013 to update data. The length of the interviews ranged from 30 to 80 minutes. In total, 17 interviews were carried out. The distribution and characteristics of the intervieweeare depicted in Table 3 .
Insert Table 3 here.
Ethical considerations were taken into account in this research. Throughout the research process, steps were taken to ensure key interviewees were protected particularly in terms of their privacy and confidentiality. All participants were assured the information they provided would only be used to fulfil the aims of research, and were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time for any reason.
Empirical study AG1
AG1 was established during the period of central planning in 1978. During the compulsory collectivisation period, the whole production process from the cultivation stage to the distribution of the harvest was bureaucratically managed. The management of labour extended even to working hours which were announced by the village bell. Regardless of their productivity, farmers were required to sell a quota of grain to the state at fixed prices. In the de-collectivisation period, following Contract 100 issued in 1981, land was distributed to the households according to family size. Land that was brought in to the cooperative by households during the collectivisation phase was also returned to them. In this period, the role of agricultural cooperatives was reduced and households were recognised as the primary units of production.
The Cooperative Law 1997 established the foundation for the old style agricultural cooperatives to convert into membership-oriented service providers. AG1 was revived and has successfully diversified services to its members, including input supply (fertilisers, pesticides and seeds), irrigation services, land preparation services, field protection services, marketing and selling of output and development of extra income-generating activities (such as poultry farming, handicraft production, construction services, ice factories, mixing of animal feeds). Irrigation services, in particular the maintenance of the distribution canals and the pumping of water, was considered one of the most important services offered by AG1 as it required a level of cooperation between farmers. The fees and contributions for irrigation services was 450 kg paddy/ha per year. To operationalize this service, AG1 bought water from the irrigation companies and then provided water to internal channels leading to the rice fields. It collected a fee from farmers for this service.
AG1 was also involved in the signing of contract farming with purchasing companies. Based on farmers' production abilities of a specific agricultural product, the cooperative looked for markets for these products and represented farmers in contract negotiations and agreements with the purchasers. After signing the contracts with the companies, the cooperative established subsequent contracts for agricultural product procurement with its members and as such the cooperative played the intermediary role in this process.
The interview with the commune authorities revealed that there was an emergence of linkages between cooperatives. AG1 formed linkages with other cooperatives in nearby localities and has maintained a regular exchange of information on market conditions, prices of materials and commodities, and sub-contracting prices in consumption contracts.
This has helped to enhance the competitiveness of the cooperatives.
According to its Chairman, AG1 is now a strong and viable organisation. It comprises over 600 households with more than 3,000 family members, and controls over 500 ha of agricultural land. However, total capital of the cooperative is still very low, about 2,175 million VND (87,000 USD). The operating capital for running service activities is even lower, accounting for only 25 percent of total capital or just 21,750 USD. The rest is the value of fixed assets. The Chairman of AG1 noted that the low level of operating capital has impeded the implementation of service provision to members of the cooperative.
AG2
Compared to AG1, AG2 is a 'newcomer' having been established in 2003. Interviewed farmers noted that before joining the cooperative, they operated as individual households.
Every morning, farmers brought their vegetables to a local market to sell. If the vegetables were accepted by vegetable stall owners, farmers would sell all their products at a wholesale price; otherwise they would sell them to consumers in the market. If they could not sell all their vegetables, they would bring them back to the village and sell them to other households as poultry food. Farmers did not maintain a long term plan for crop selection, rather they planted based on the current price in the market. If a particular vegetable price was low, its cultivation would be stopped and a different vegetable crop would be sown. Therefore, their income from vegetables was very low and highly dependent on the fluctuations in market prices. This led to most farmers lacking surplus capital and prevented them from purchasingpesticides and fertilisers. Farmers did not pay attention to cultivation techniques to improve output because they were either unaware of or lacked information about market demand.
By 2002, purchasing companies, such as supermarkets and food catering companies came to the province to propose a plan to purchase clean vegetables on a large scale. This triggered authorities into considering the establishment of a co-operative to meet the projected demand.
AG2 had a very modest start with 20 members, each of whom contributed a total amount of 200,000 VND (roughly 8 USD), mostly to build a cooperative office (on the borrowed land of the commune committee) and for other administrative costs. The management board of the cooperative initially had three people who worked without salary.
From the outset, AG2 was actively supported by the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD). For example, the DARD distributed a budget of nearly 100 million VND (4,000 USD) to support the cultivation of clean vegetables by providing training on cultivation techniques to all members of the cooperative. Most importantly, DARD facilitated the signing of contract farming between the cooperative and agricultural product purchasers. Previously, the cooperative focused on production, and passively waited for purchasers to come to them. Based on their wide networks, DARD was in touch with a large number of potential purchasers and acted as a link between these companies and AG2.
At present, there are 36 companies including both small retail stores and large purchasing companies that have signed contracts with AG2 for the supply of vegetables.
The terms and conditions in these contracts specify that the cooperative is responsible for vegetable origins and their quality, and that government food safety standards will be strictly adhered. The board members of the cooperative thus monitor closely the cultivation process at each household member to ensure the quality is met. Also AG2 is responsible for delivering the products in accordance with the terms of the contract relating to quantity, time and place of delivery. Selling prices are set at the market level. However, the cooperative offers purchasers preferential conditions such as deferred payment after the delivery of the products. If the price set in the contract is higher than the market price due to price fluctuations, the purchasers have the right to deduct the difference during the next trading round.
Interviewed farmers believed that they now have much better knowledge of cultivating, harvesting, packaging, categorising and transporting their products as well as better access to market information. Therefore, their incomes from clean vegetable have significantly improved. Members are committed to the cooperative and always give priority to the cooperative when it comes to selling their products. They appreciate that their products are bought at a fair market price and that they are shielded from fluctuations in market demand, which was a big concern for farmers prior to the cooperative. The Chairman shared that cooperative membership has increased from 20 persons in 2003 to 34 persons currently.
According to him, on average, the cooperative members earn around 50-70 million VND per ha (2,000 -2,800 USD), compared to 20 -50 million VND per ha (800 -2,000 USD) when they operated individually prior to 2003.
Discussions
Smallbone and Welter (2001) observed that the dominant feature influencing the nature and pace of entrepreneurship development in transition economies is the external environment, which, in some cases, appears hostile in social, economic and political terms. In addition, the social context inherited from the former socialist period appears to affect both the attitudes and behaviour of entrepreneurs and the attitudes of society at large towards entrepreneurship.
Like the private sector, agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam have encountered numerous problems from the lack of enterprise culture during the socialist period. In addition, the support infrastructure has not always been sufficient to help them to overcome such problems. The Vietnamese economy has market institutions and infrastructures that are largely undeveloped (Le et al., 2006) . They face higher transaction costs and have limited access to credit and other inputs. The case studies indicate that appropriate support from the government can greatly enhance the performance of agricultural cooperatives. Government policy has had a strong influence on farmer cooperative establishment and development. This finding is similar to studies of farmer cooperatives development in China, a country that shares many similarities to Vietnam in terms of historical traditions, domestic economies, which are predominantly agrarian and rice cultivating, and the transition from formerly centralplanned into increasingly market-oriented economies (see for example Garnevska et al. 2011) . However, it is contrary to Bekkum's (2001) research findings that show that government policy has a limited impact on cooperative development in liberalized economies.
Although an extensive range of support policies are available to cooperatives, there is still a problem with their implementation. The policies have not been consistently implemented across agencies or at different administrative levels. Therefore, the support seems to be dependent on the efforts of government officials or cooperative leaders. For example, it is always difficult to get access to credit for cooperatives to invest and expand their production but a personal relationship between the cooperative manager and local government officials can make it easier. Another issue is the lack of targeted support measures for sectors and subsectors. The high level support programs have not been effective in meeting the needs of specific sectors. For example, training courses are provided in the area of product marketing but not at the level of marketing of agricultural produce.
Agricultural cooperatives account for more than half of the existing cooperatives in Vietnam.
They have contributed significantly to creating employment and income for their own members and additional workers. Despite the decline in the number of agricultural cooperatives in the last 10 years, they still provide a large number of employment. However, the share of the collective sector in general and agricultural cooperatives in particular in GDP is still limited. The collective sector contributed only 5.2 per cent to GDP in 2011 making it the smallest sector in the economy of Vietnam (GSO 2012) . Furthermore, the size of agricultural cooperatives in Vietnam is relatively small with 20 members on average for each cooperative (GSO 2012, 59 ). Thus, they could increase their size to reach a more efficient scale.
Future development of cooperatives in Vietnam need to focus on supporting cooperatives to expand, become more diversified in their activities, improve management staff capacity and worker skills. In the agriculture sector, provinces are asked by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to identify models that work in different sub-sectors and in different types of products and services so that they can be replicated in similar contexts (Nguyen 2012) . Efforts are being focused on innovating, developing and improving the efficiency of current agricultural co-operatives. In addition, the development of agricultural cooperatives with operations in production, business, and general services as well as specialized agricultural cooperatives are being encouraged by the Government. Increasingly, agriculture cooperatives attempt to offer quality produce with better value to not only the local market but also export markets.
Implications Theoretical implications
As discussed in the literature review, an institutionalist approach is a very useful tool to analysis firms' behaviours. It highlights the causal relation between institutional arrangements and firms' structure and characteristics. This study acknowledges the contributions of the institutionalist approach. However, it is argued that the institutionalist analysis comes short in investigating transitional economies and the form of economic organisations which exist within them as it fails to convey a sense of 'changefulness' of a business system (Martin and Beaumont, 2001) . Taking into account profound changes and volatility within the Vietnamese business system in the last three decades and in the external environments (the process of regionalisation and globalisation), this research sees the need to integrate the notion of institutional dynamics into the current 'static' institutionalism (Thelen and Steimo, 1992) .
Furthermore, it is clear that in the context of Vietnam, despite the availability of extensive institutions set out to govern and and support agricultural cooperatives, their successful development is not guarranteed. Formal institutions could not make agricultural cooperatives work in the earlier periods. Many initiatives failed or encountered strong resistance because without the basic principles of voluntary participation, there was a lack of participation from cooperative members. In addition, formal institutions alone do not automatically lead to the implementation of supporting policies at the local level to benefit agricultural cooperatives.
Thus, an institutionalist approach which solely relies on a rational assumption of a direct link between institutional arrangements and the development of business organisations (Maurice et al., 1996; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Lane, 1992; Whitley, 1999) will fail to fully explain the success or failure of cooperatives as demonstrated in this study. An integrative approach that highlights the roles all the stakeholders, their bargaining powers and the interaction amongst them is needed in any analysis of firms' behaviours. Furthermore, it is not only institutioanl arrangement at national level needs to account for the development of organisations, their agencies at provincial and local levels are also extremely important in this process.
Practical implications
Vietnam's experience with the transformation of the cooperative sector could offer several useful lessons for other economies attemping to develop agricultural cooperatives. First, the formation of cooperatives should be based on voluntary participation. The coercive nature of agricultural cooperatives in earlier periods in Vietnam resulted in the limited success of the cooperatives as it did not provide incentives for members to perform and deliver. Second, new policy and regulation to support cooperatives do not automatically lead to growth in the number of cooperatives. In fact, the number of cooperatives established should not be seen as a success factor of government policy . Administrators shoud also focus on quality and efficiency of the newly formed cooperatives and not only on growing the number per se.
Third, policy implementation has to be monitored closely as it is the key to delivering intended outcomes and this is particularly important at the local level. It is important to make timely adjustments that are relevant to sectoral and local conditions to support the growth and development of cooperatives. Fourth, the transition towards a market economy requires cooperative managers to upgrade their business management knowledge and skills which had been poorly developed during the central planning period and are not suitable in the current situation. Fifth, diversifying products, upgrading technology, introducing innovation have the potential to increase efficiency and this will help cooperatives to add value, become more competitive and move up the value chain. Finally, policymakers and cooperative managers will need to set priorities for each period in the development of cooperatives so that their limited and valuable resources can be maximised to achieve their respective goals for each period.
Limitations
This research has been conducted within a definite time scale and is subject to some limitations in research methodology and scope. First, adopting a qualitative method, it does not rely on a large sample as with a survey approach. The rationale of choosing the qualitative method is provided in the methodology section, and the approach has been proven to be a sharp tool to solve the research questions posed by this research; nevertheless, broad generalisation to a large number of cooperatives can be problematic. Second, the study concentrates only on one industry. If the research had encompassed other industries, the outcomes would have consisted of a more complete picture of cooperatives across industries.
Lastly, the focus of this study is on two successful cooperatives, thus unsuccessful cooperatives are excluded from this study. An analysis of unsuccessful firms could have provided valuable lessons on the management of cooperatives, especially in the context of transforming economies.
Conclusion
Vietnamese agricultural cooperatives have witnessed great changes and transformation in the last six decades and are still in a transformation phase, whereby there is a slow conversion of 
